AD-A284 066



U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1663

Peacekeeping in Somalia

Joan Harman
U.S. Army Research Institute



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5

94-28918

July 1994

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94 9 06 003

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and re-rewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this outcen, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Holdway, Suite 1204, Artinigton, VA 22202-4302, and to the Chick of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, OC 201033.

Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 222						
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave bia	ank)	2. REPORT DATE 1994, July		3. REPORT TYPE A		COVERED 92 - Dec 94
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE					5. FUNC	DING NUMBERS
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6. AUTHOR(S)					nor	
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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES						
						
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Peace making						
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT		CURITY CLASSIFICATION F THIS PAGE	19.	SECURITY CLASSIF OF ABSTRACT	ICATION	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
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
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

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Research Report 1663

Peacekeeping in Somalia

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Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Department of the Army

July 1994

Army Project Number 2Q263007A792

Manpower and Personnel

One primary mission of the Organization and Personnel Resources Research Unit of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences is to carry out state-of-the-art personnel resources research that will provide the Army with timely information on which to base future planning and policy making.

This Research Report presents attitudes, opinions, and experiences of veterans of the Somalia peacekeeping deployment. Results of individual interviews and questionnaires show general discontent with the mission, although most soldiers expressed the opinion that the U.S. Army performed well in Somalia. Many also gave high ratings to the performance of their leaders, from battalion levels to unit levels.

The Army can use the results of this research to plan, equip, and support future peacekeeping missions.

EDGAR M. JOHNSON Director

I am exceedingly grateful to Paul A. Gade, Laurel W. Oliver, and Corporal H. Wayne Browning for their invaluable assistance in gathering and analyzing research data for this project, and to David R. Segal for his helpful advice and suggestions. I also wish to thank David Marlowe of the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research for printing the questionnaires used in this research. Without his timely help, the questionnaire portion of the research could not have been accomplished.

PEACEKEEPING IN SOMALIA

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PEACEKEEPING IN SOMALIA

Introduction

Organized attempts to deter or avoid warfare proliferated well before the twentieth century. Global warfare during this century, however, inspired more systematic and better organized efforts to intervene between or among belligerent parties to restore peace; i.e., efforts of the League of Nations and the United Nations. What gave the strongest impetus to preventing or limiting warfare after World War II was the development of nuclear weapons (Segal & Segal, 1993). The catastrophic nature of nuclear war focused international support for the United Nations deployment of military forces to control armed conflict. In 1965, the United Nations formed the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations.

The compelling need to avoid warfare following World War II resulted in a constantly increasing number of peacekeeping interventions. One result of this development has been the exploration of each instance to determine what can be learned that would improve the success of future peacekeeping operations. Some investigators reviewed episodes prior to and/or following World War II (Argersinger, 1991; Browne, 1984; Diehl, 1988; Lofgren, 1990; Pelcovits & Kramer, 1976; Segal & Segal, 1993; Segal & Waldman, 1992; Terrill, 1989; Titterton, 1975). Others focused their queries on individual instances of peacekeeping such as Cyprus (Coupoudakis, 1976), Lebanon (Malone, Miller & Robben, 1985; Mauer, 1984), and Northern Ireland (Lee, 1973).

A common observation that has emerged from these inquiries is that every episode of peacekeeping has been substantively different from every other. According to Segal and Segal (1993) "Peacekeeping is neither clearly established as an idea nor as a process. As a label, it has been applied to a broad range of activities sharing little but the label." Because the concept is still evolving, a variety of definitions have been proposed. Perhaps the most succinct is provided by Argersinger (1991). He proposed that the criteria that must apply to every operation that is labeled peacekeeping include the consent of all conflicting parties, the impartiality of the deployed force, and the restriction of the use of force to self-defense.

The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992. The Resolution stated that "the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security" and authorized Member States to use all necessary means to establish

a secure environment for humanitarian relief (Rosenfeld, 1993). During the same month, the United States deployed troops assigned to the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) to Somalia.

This report describes findings from questionnaires and interviews involving 518 Somalia veterans at Fort Drum, New York. The Somalia peacekeeping mission is unique because it started as a humanitarian mission and evolved into combat. Information gathered about the mission may afford valuable opportunities to improve the effectiveness of future peacekeeping doctrine, force development and training. Because the questions used for the interviews and questionnaires were not identical, the findings will be reported separately. However, in both cases, soldiers were invited to make comments about their experiences that they wanted communicated to the Army. These comments are consistent across both methods of inquiry and so will be reported together.

Interviews

Method

Subjects. Thirty-one Somalia veterans participated in individual interviews. Their ranks were: PVT to PFC (21%), CPL (52%), SGT and SSG (16%), SFC (3%), and CPT (6%). Their Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) included 62% Infantry, 16% Medical, 16% Food Service Specialist, 3% Intelligence Analyst and 3% Logistic Advisor. Their time in the Army ranged from 10 months to 17 years. Thirty-five percent were married. All of the soldiers were members of the same battalion, had returned from Somalia during December 1993 and 3 soldiers had been deployed to Somalia twice. All had served during Operation Continue Hope.

<u>Procedure</u>. U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) researchers conducted individual structured interviews (see Appendix A for Interview Guide) of about 1 hour's duration over 2 days' time. Respondents were guaranteed anonymity.

Results

Background and Preparation for Deployment. Forty-two percent of the soldiers had been deployed for the first time in their Army careers. Of the remainder, most had deployed to Homestead, Florida, and a few to Cuba. Two soldiers had deployed to Panama and one to Sinai. Most soldiers (65%) reacted to the Somalia assignment with apprehension or uncertainty. A smaller percentage (32%) were eager to participate in a real mission and to experience an exotic environment, and this included one soldier who got his PCS orders cancelled in order to go.

Eighty percent of the soldiers said that they had been well briefed on the mission before deploying. When asked if they had

performed duties they expected to perform, 77% said yes or pretty much. Those who demurred claimed they had not expected such requirements as long work hours or so many combat duties, had not expected to perform Military Police duties and had not expected to be shot down in a helicopter. When asked about preparation for deployment in terms of training, briefings for soldiers and families, and assistance to prepare to deploy, 74% said they were well prepared, whereas the remainder referred to needs for: better preparation for job tasks and rules of engagement, additional time to take care of personal matters, more attention to dependents' needs, and orientation briefings after arriving in Somalia.

When asked about personal combat readiness prior to deployment, 77% of the soldiers claimed they were good to excellent. Those who said they were less than ready reported that they had just finished Advanced Individual Training or had just received a new job assignment; one soldier said that he hadn't had much infantry training. Then they were asked about their readiness now that they had returned. Seventy-four percent claimed to still be combat ready or were even better than before deployment because they had gained valuable experience. A number of soldiers pointed out that they had just returned from block leave and so needed to sharpen up a bit. They were asked about their unit's readiness after redeployment. Eighty-seven percent indicated that the unit was ready to go into combat. Once again, a few soldiers pointed out the need to sharpen up after leave and one said that they had just received a group of new people who needed training.

Observations and Experiences during Deployment. The soldiers were asked to rate the overall performance of the U.S. Army in Somalia. Most responses were favorable (68%) and ranged from fairly well to superb. Those who did not share the favorable viewpoint offered criticisms such as low morale because of boredom, poor use of resources, frustration about the cease fire after October 3-4, lack of discipline in support units, careless security in support units, underestimating the enemy, and the arrogance of rangers.

Then the soldiers described the duties they actually performed in Somalia and were asked if these tasks were part of their combat-related jobs. All but one soldier related the duties to those they were trained to perform in a combat situation. One Noncommissioned Officer reported that he did training, not combat. Another soldier emphasized that the tasks were "urban" combat tasks, still another said that he did his own plus Military Police tasks. When asked if they found it useful to perform these tasks, all but one soldier strongly agreed that it was very useful to experience a real world situation that tested their training, two soldiers referred to the benefits of live fire training and one soldier said "it saved my life." When

asked what they would change about the way they performed tasks during the mission if they were able to do so, the most common answer was "nothing" (36%). Those who favored changes referred to being even more skilled and doing more than they did with greater speed, making the rules of engagement less restrictive, dealing exclusively with U.S. forces, and being less friendly with Somali children.

When asked whether any problems were encountered because of participating with a joint United Nations force, 61% answered yes. The most commonly mentioned problem was language difficulties. They also mentioned that other countries' troops were getting paid more a \language doing less, that U.N. rules of engagement were too restrictive (more restrictive than U.S. rules), that they had confidence only in the Tunisian military, and that U.S. forces should act independently of U.N. forces. In contrast, one soldier stated that "we got along like one big happy family."

We asked the soldiers about living conditions in Somalia. All commented favorably and the most frequent comment was "better than expected" (32%). These soldiers had talked to those who had deployed during the first months of the mission, and so were grateful for roofs, floors, showers and hot food.

Performance of Leaders. Soldiers were asked to rate the performance of their leaders during the deployment and to disclose what the leaders did well and what they did poorly. Ninety percent gave the leaders high ratings. Those who disagreed commented that battalion level leaders were very good but lower levels less effective, and that leaders at higher levels than battalion were focused on politics and indifferent to soldiers.

In terms of good performance, the most frequent responses were that they took care of their troops, kept morale high, were cool under fire/pressure, and saved a lot of lives. Respondents also mentioned that their leaders led from the front, planned well, kept their soldiers informed, obtained needed resources, and ensured soldiers' physical well being. When asked whether the Somalia experience improved their leaders' performance, all but one soldier said that it improved them both as trainers and as leaders in combat.

The most frequent response to the inquiry about what leaders did poorly was "nothing" (42%). Other comments included poor performance on administrative tasks, communicating to troops, sensitivity to burnout, cross training on weapons, firmly fixing a redeployment date, controlling rumors, providing guidance in stress management, and, at top Army levels, worrying more about careers than about soldiers.

Perspectives on the Changing Army. We asked them for their opinions about the Army's participating in alternative missions; i.e., "operations other than war:" peacekeeping, drug interdiction, civilian disorder, disaster relief, counter terrorism, and training federal, state and municipal employees.

Concerning peacekeeping, 45% said yes the Army should participate, 26% said no and the remainder were ambivalent. Many of the soldiers who said yes attached conditions to the participation such as only if the U.S. is in charge, that we should stay out of civil wars, that the Army should not get tied up in little conflicts, only if a lot of people are getting killed, only if we do more to defuse the situation ahead of time, only if we are allowed to do the job, and only if the government guarantees that it is in the national interest. Those who said no added that we should not go into combat, that the Army is a fighting force and should not hand out grain, that we shouldn't get in the middle of other countries' conflicts, that the Army is already stretched too far, and that we should concentrate on domestic problems.

In the case of drug interdiction, 77% believed that the Army should participate and proposed conditions such as if it is a U.S. problem and only in the continental United States. Those opposed said that there are other agencies such as DEA and the Coast Guard to handle the problem or that intervention should be on a state, not a national level.

For civilian disorder, 58% felt that the Army should participate if the local authorities were unable to control conditions, and because Active Army members are more disciplined than the National Guard. One soldier said that the Army should send Military Police to deal with a disorder. Those opposed most commonly pointed out that controlling disorder is a National Guard function and, before calling on the Army, local and state resources should be tapped.

Disaster relief elicited yes responses 71% of the time. These soldiers mentioned a desire to help out fellow countrymen, to let civilians get to know the Army, and they observed that people really appreciate such help. One soldier said that the tasks are more suited to Army engineers and that combat troops should only be used in cases of looters. Those opposed claimed that such relief is a National Guard function and, if they and the state police cannot cope, the Active Army should respond as a last resort. Others contended that the mission would detract from training.

In the case of counter terrorism, 70% of the responses were yes, most often with the condition that it should be as a last resort. One soldier said that the activity should be confined to the U.S. Those opposed commonly said that Special Forces and

Delta Groups should be called upon, not the other components of the Active Army.

For training civilians, 81% felt that it was a good idea and two soldiers suggested that it be made reciprocal. The remaining responses were no or don't know.

We asked what special training, if any, would be needed to participate in alternative missions. Only four soldiers (13%) said none. The most common suggestions for training addressed peacekeeping. Soldiers suggested training in: how to deal with other cultures, public relations/affairs, interacting with foreign military, negotiating, languages, and "mental health" training to ensure that soldiers understand that not every mission involves combat. One soldier proposed that there be a special MOS for peacekeeping. Another suggested a special task force to deal with drug interdiction. Respondents also mentioned training in riot control, surveillance, emergency procedures and drug detection.

The next question asked whether the special training would affect combat readiness. Fifty-two percent said no. Those who believed that combat readiness would be adversely affected said that training should focus on infantry tasks or soldiers will lose combat sharpness, that picking up garbage during the disaster relief mission in Homestead demeaned the infantry job, and that switching back and forth from one kind of training to another is risky.

We asked whether respondents would volunteer for another mission like Somalia. Sixty-one percent said no. Those who offered reasons said that the mission was not in defense of family or country, that combat troops should perform combat missions, that we didn't feel needed, that we didn't do any real good, that we shouldn't be involved in another country's civil war, that U.S. troops were poorly resourced, and that Division level didn't provide enough support. The most commonly expressed reason had to do with family separation. Those who provided reasons for yes answers said that they had helped people, that it would be better than training all the time, and that it had been a good learning experience. Others said that they would volunteer if the unit deployed and if the mission were clear.

Then we asked if they would volunteer for the other alternative missions. Seventy-one percent said yes and many stipulated the alternative missions for which they would volunteer; e.g., for a humanitarian mission, or "if I were helping U.S. people." Others said that they would not volunteer but would go if ordered.

<u>Personal Effects of the Deployment</u>. The soldiers were requested to remember especially stressful situations during the

deployment. The most common response (39%) referred to the firefight on October 3rd-4th during which 18 soldiers were killed and 84 were wounded. Others referred to multiple firefights or to being shelled, being pinned down, reloading a MARK 19 on top of a HUMVEE in the middle of a firefight, being shot at and taking shrapnel in a helicopter, and being fired upon when unable to retaliate because of the rules of engagement. Still others referred to televising bodies being dragged through the streets, to boredom, overwork, needing equipment that they were unable to get, and sharing a small room with nine people.

When asked if the Somalia experience improved their performance as soldiers, 94% said their performance had improved. They referred to both personal and professional benefits. In terms of personal benefits, they said they had matured, learned endurance, adaptability, self confidence, and not to take many things for granted. Professionally, they learned the value of training, especially live fire training, and what to expect and do under fire. One soldier observed that, after October 4th, many soldiers who had been eager for combat "simmered down."

<u>Career Intentions</u>. We asked whether the soldiers had intended to make a career in the Army prior to the deployment. Thirty-two percent said yes, 35% said no and the remainder were undecided. Then we asked whether they had changed their intentions. Thirty-two percent said that they still intended to make a career in the Army, 48% said that they planned to get out, 16% were undecided and one soldier was leaving the Army on disability from wounds received in Somalia.

Reasons given for deciding not to make a career in the Army included: because I didn't get a fair shake from my platoon, because my unit deploys so much of the time, because I'm not getting encouraged to reenlist, because I don't want to go far away from home and fight again, because I didn't like what I saw in Somalia and working with the U.N. was a mess, because of the possibility of going to Bosnia, because the Army doesn't get national support and has become a shell, and because of many factors including Somalia. Two of those who were undecided said that they might reenlist if they could switch to a non-combat MOS.

Family Issues. We inquired into communications with families during the deployment. Soldiers were able to communicate by telephone and by mail. Those who had access to an AUTOVON line were grateful for it but reported that lines to use the phones were very long, that they could talk for only ten minutes and that they were frequently cut off. Those who communicated with family members who couldn't be reached by AUTOVON made fewer calls because they were concerned about cost.

Many soldiers pointed out that both sending and receiving mail was very slow, but they tended to think that it wasn't too bad. Also, their officers helped them to make video tapes to send home to their families

Comments about whether families fared well in the absence of the soldiers were somewhat sparse because most respondents (65%) were unmarried. Those who did comment reported that their spouses were worried about the deployment and one said that his family was up in arms about the October 3rd-4th events. They also said that false rumors caused consternation. One soldier reported that officers wrote to the soldiers' families and they found this reassuring.

The question about whether spouses supported the deployment elicited responses such as "yes but reluctantly" and that she supported the soldiers, not the mission. Then we asked how spouses were feeling now that the soldiers had returned. They said their wives felt glad and grateful that they were back but that soldiers lost their lives for nothing and they wouldn't want their husbands to go again.

We asked how their children felt about the mission now that their fathers had returned. Even among the small number of married soldiers who had children, most of the children were too young to understand the deployment. One soldier with an older child reported that his son was glad that his father was home, prayed for his father a lot, and that his school offered him a lot of support. In contrast, another soldier reported that his son had been traumatized by the disasters and the episode of bodies being dragged through the streets shown on CNN, and that he was attempting to arrange for counseling.

Questionnaires

Some of the questions in the questionnaire distinguish Operation Restore Hope from Operation Continue Hope. Operation Restore Hope covers the deployment period from December 1992 to May 1993 during which the mission was largely humanitarian. Operation Continue Hope covers the deployment period from June 1993 onward during which the mission included combat.

Method

<u>Subjects</u>. Four hundred and eighty-seven Somalia veterans filled out questionnaires. Their ranks were 20% PVT to PFC, 55% CPL, 19% SGT and SST, 4% SFC to SM, and 6% 2LT to MAJ. Their education levels were 66% high school diploma or GED, 5% professional degree, 26% 1-2 years of college with no degree, 3% associate degree, 1% 3-4 years of college with no degree, 3% bachelor's degree, .4% master's degree. Forty-four percent were

married. Sixty percent had deployed to Somalia during August and September 1993 and returned in December 1993.

Procedure. ARI researchers administered questionnaires (see Appendix B for the Questionnaire) that required about one hour for completion, and were administered over two days during January 1994. The questionnaires asked for soldiers' names and social security numbers. During each session's introductory address, soldiers were told that this information was being gathered so that ARI could carry out follow up research with them in a few years' time. They were also told that they were not required to answer any questions they were unwilling to answer. In addition, page two of the questionnaire presented the information that only ARI researchers would have access to the questionnaires and that no penalty would be imposed for not answering any question.

Results

Background and Preparation for Deployment. Fifty-five percent of the soldiers had deployed for missions other than Somalia including eight percent who had deployed for Operation Desert Storm. Tables 1 through 4 reflect respondents' opinions about their preparedness for deployment. Categories "very well prepared" are collapsed with "well prepared", and categories "not at all prepared" are collapsed with "not well prepared."

Table 1

Level of Preparation to Deploy (percent)

	Well Prepared	Moderately Prepared	Not Well Prepared
When initially notified of deployment	58	29	13
Now	56	32	12

Table 2

Level of Preparation to Perform Operations Other Than War Duties
(percent)

	Well	Prepared	Moderately Prepared	Not Well Prepared
Before Operation Restore Hope (before December 1993)		63	28	8
During Operation Restore Hope (12/94 - 6/93)		68	27	5
During Operation Continue Hope (6/93 - present)		72	23	5
Today		72	22	6

Table 3

Level of Preparation to Perform Wartime Duties (percent)

	Well Prepared	Moderately Prepared	Not Well Prepared
Before Operation Restore Hope	70	24	6
During Operation Restore Hope	74	20	6
During Operation Continue Hope	79	16	5
Today	77	17	6

Table 4
Soldiers Who Received Briefings Prior to Deployment (percent)

Topic of Briefing		
Somalia Politics and Culture	95	
Health Risks in Somalia	97	
The Somalia Mission	86	
Rules of Engagement	95	

To the question concerning the number of days prior notice they had received before deploying to Somalia, 61% said 16 or more days, 16% said 12-15 days, 6% said 8-11 days, 11% said 4-7 days, 3% said 2-3 days, and 3% said 1 day or less. We also asked to what extent their wartime mission prepared them for duties in Somalia. Eighteen percent responded to a very great extent, 31% responded to a great extent, 34% responded to a moderate extent, 9% responded to a slight extent, and 5% responded not at all.

Observations and Experiences during the Deployment. The soldiers were asked about particular events they experienced during the deployment. Table 5 provides a listing of general events.

Table 5

<u>Events Soldiers Experienced During the Somalia Deployment (percent)</u>

	Yes	No
Served in Unit that relocated Civilian Noncombatants	17	83
Served in Unit that provided medical support to Civilians	25	75
Served in Unit that constructed surface transportation	12	88
Served in Unit that provided water treatment and/or basic sanitation	14	86
Served in Unit that moved supplies to remote areas	36	64

Table 5 cont'd

	Yes	No
Served in Unit that provided food/supplies to civilians	34	66
Served in Unit that protected relief workers/sites	60	40
Was stationed at Forward Observation Post	44	56
Received incoming ARTY, Rocket or Mortar Fire	66	34
Encountered Mines or Booby Traps	44	56
Received Sniper or Sapper Fire	88	12
Went on Combat Patrols	84	16
Went on Peacekeeping Patrols	65	35
Was in Patrol that was Ambushed	53	47
Fired Rounds at Hostile Somali	67	33
Was surrounded by Hostile Somali	70	30
Witnessed Civilian Casualties	70	30
Witnessed Hostile Somali Casualties	75	25
Witnessed Unit Casualties	55	45
Witnessed Casualties among Allied Troops	47	53

Then the soldiers were asked to what extent various occurrences created problems in Somalia. Table 6 shows these responses. The category "very great extent" is collapsed with "great extent", and the category "not at all" is collapsed with "slight extent."

Table 6

Extent to Which Soldiers Experienced Problems (percent)

	Great	Moderate	Slight
Insects, Snakes, Scorpions, etc.	31	32	36
Heat	63	23	14
Boredom	73	17	10
Unfamiliar Diseases	25	31	42
Maintaining Personal Hygiene	25	29	46
Having a Clearly Defined Mission	53	22	25
Identifying Friends and Foes	46	17	37
Following Restrictive Rules of Engagement	54	22	24
Having a Constantly Changing Mission	51	24	26

We asked the soldiers to provide ratings of morale levels at several points in time. Table 7 displays these ratings. The category "very high" has been collapsed with "high", and "very low" has been collapsed with "low."

Table 7

Soldiers' Ratings of Morale Levels (percent)

	High	Moderate	Low
Personal Morale during Operation Restore Hope	29	45	25
Unit Morale during Operation Restore Hope	24	52	24
Personal Morale during Operation Continue Hope	30	43	27
Unit Morale during Operation Continue Hope	29	44	28
Current Personal Morale	47	33	20
Current Unit Morale	37	43	19

<u>Perspectives on the Changing Army</u>. The soldiers were asked if they would support operations other than war. Table 8 shows these responses.

Table 8

Soldiers' Support for Operations Other Than War (percent)

	Definitely Would	Probably Would	Probably Not	Definitely Not
Combat Flow of Illegal Drugs in U.S.	65	21	6	9
Disaster Relief in U.S.	67	25	5	3
Humanitarian Relief Outside of U.S.	15	29	32	24
Part of U.N. Peacekeeping	16	25	29	30
Counter Terrorism in U.S.	76	18	3	3
Maintain Military Presenc Overseas	e 47	39	8	6
Training Federal, State and Municipal Employees	44	38	11	7

Then they were asked if they believed they could succeed in operations other than war under particular conditions. Table 9 reflects these opinions. The category "strongly agree" has been collapsed with "agree", and the category "strongly disagree" has been collapsed with "disagree."

Table 9

Soldiers' Opinions About Success in Operations Other Than War (percent)

Succeed with:	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree
training the Army has provided	75	16	8
equipment the Army has provided	59	24	18
weapons the Army has provided	69	16	15
abilities and training of unit leaders	68	19	13
abilities and training of unit soldiers	78	15	6

We asked for the soldiers' opinions concerning how confident they were about soldiers' willingness to stay in the shrinking Army. To the question about whether the best officers will stay, 6% were extremely confident, 15% were very confident, 35% were moderately confident, 30% were somewhat unsure, and 14% were very unsure. In the case of the best Noncommissioned Officers, 7% said they were extremely confident that they would stay, 16% were very confident, 29% were moderately confident, 29% were somewhat unsure, and 19% were very unsure. For the best junior enlisted soldiers, 6% said they were extremely confident that they would stay, 12% were very confident, 26% were moderately confident, 27% were somewhat unsure and 28% were very unsure.

Personal Effects of the Deployment. The soldiers were asked about their levels of satisfaction with a variety of occurrences during Operation Restore/Continue Hope. Table 10 shows these satisfaction levels. The category "very dissatisfied" has been collapsed with "dissatisfied", and the category "very satisfied" has been collapsed with "satisfied."

Soldiers' Satisfaction With Events That Occurred During the Somalia Deployment (percent)

	Dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Satisfied
support from the American people	12	29	68
performance of U.S. soldiers	4	8	88
decisions made by top U.S. military	57	26	18
decisions made by top U.N. military	66	27	7
recognition for soldiers' performance	49	20	30

We asked them to choose their levels of agreement with statements about their work groups, about members of their work groups, and about their work group leaders. Tables 11, 12, and 13 show these opinions. The category "strongly agree" has been collapsed with "agree", and the category "strongly disagree" has been collapsed with "disagree."

Table 11
Soldiers' Attitudes About Their Jobs (percent)

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
I don't mind taking on extra duties and responsibilities	51	31	18
I work hard and try to do as good a job as possible	88	9	3
I look forward to coming to work every day	22	36	41
I'm involved in my work	55	28	19

Table 12

Soldiers' Opinions About Work Group Members (percent)

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
They work well as a team	79	14	7
They pull together to get the job done	80	13	7
They really care about each other	56	30	14
They trust each other	62	24	14

Table 13
Soldiers' Opinions About Work Group Leaders (percent)

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
They work well as a team	49	30	21
They pull together to get the job done	59	25	16
They really care about each other	33	38	29
They trust each other	41	32	27

The soldiers were asked what they would recommend if they met someone who wanted advice about joining the Army. Fifty-three percent said they would recommend joining the Army, 25% would recommend joining another military service, and 22% would recommend not joining any military service.

Career Intentions. When asked about their current active Army career intentions, 11% said they would probably stay in until retirement, 11% would definitely stay in until retirement, 21% would probably stay in beyond the present obligation but not necessarily until retirement, 9% would definitely stay in beyond the present obligation but not necessarily until retirement, 17% would probably leave upon completion of the present obligation.

and 30% would definitely leave upon completion of the present obligation.

Personal and Family Issues. As a result of a problem with the printing of the response categories for a number of questions under this heading, the validity of the responses is in doubt. Therefore, the responses will not be reported here. The questions involved are 92 through 96, 98 through 102, and 109 through 113.

We asked about marital status and 44% of the soldiers reported that they were married, 5% were separated or filing for divorce, 4% were divorced, and 47% were single and never married.

We asked the soldiers if their spouses/girlfriends supported their making a career of the Army. Forty percent said that they were very supportive, 13% said they were fairly supportive, 26% said that they were neutral, 4% said that they were fairly unsupportive, 10% said they were very unsupportive, and 7% said that they didn't know.

Then we asked to what extent the soldiers would count on a variety of people to help with a personal or family problem. Table 14 displays these responses.

Extent to Which Soldiers Can Count on Help With Personal or Family Problem (percent)

	Very Great	Great	Moderate	Slight	None
from place of duty officer	16	18	30	22	14
from place of duty NCO	22	26	27	15	10
from co-worker	25	29	31	10	5
from Army neighbor or friend	21	25	25	17	12
from non-Army neighbor or friend	24	19	25	14	18
from Army Service Agency	10	19	35	16	20
from civilian Service Agency	10	15	28	21	25
from parents or close relatives	58	21	10	5	6

We inquired about whether soldiers had returned early from Somalia due to a personal or family problem. Only 4% answered yes. We also asked married soldiers about the state of their marriages before and after they deployed to Somalia. Tables 15 and 16 provide this information. Observe that some respondents chose more than one alternative.

Table 15
Status of Soldiers' Marriages Before Deploying (percent)

going extremely well	70
going fairly well	61
might be in trouble	17
seriously thinking about divorce	12
seriously discussed divorce or separation	12
filed for divorce or separation	6

Status of Soldiers' Marriages After Deploying (percent)

going extremely well	65
going fairly well	59
might be in trouble	22
seriously thinking about divorce	16
seriously discussed divorce or separation	16
filed for divorce or separation	10

Soldiers' Comments

All of the soldiers interviewed and 106 (22%) of those who filled out the questionnaire offered comments. At first glance, it may appear that the comments are predominantly critical and negative. However, it may be that those who wished to convey specific information to the Army were also those who had considered ways in which changes could have improved the deployment. If that is the case, it follows that those who

preferred not to supply comments cannot be judged to be either positively or negatively disposed to the experience. Whatever may be the case, the Army cannot lose by exposure to the attitudes and feelings of these Somalia veterans.

The comment made most frequently concerned soldiers' perceptions that they had lacked a clearly defined mission. They made statements such as "needed a clear, concise mission," that it was a "shooting-humanitarian mission," that "we should have known what we were getting into," that it was a "learn as you go experience," that there was a "lack of a defined goal from policymakers," that "it didn't have high level political support," and that "morale was lowered by the ever changing mission and because there was no measure of success."

The next most frequent comment had to do with the nature of the mission. Some of the comments were "all Somalia was politics," "there was no reason for 18 dead Americans," "it was a lost cause," Somalia wasted time, money and lives," "we fought for nothing," "there was a needless loss of lives," "we should have stopped at Restore Hope; Continue Hope shouldn't have happened," and "Somalia was a mistake."

The next most frequent comment concerned rules of engagement. Soldiers said that the "inability to return fire was upsetting," that the rules were "too strict," that "we needed flexible ROEs," that we "felt that we had our hands tied," that "ROEs should be in favor of the peacekeepers."

A number of soldiers expressed strong feelings about awarding the Combat Infantryman's Badge. Their comments included "the combat patch is bull without the CIB," "the CIB was withheld because of the date of redeployment," the CIB should be awarded because there was "more pressure to do the job without force," "we had the discipline not to start firefights," and the Army should "award the CIB by units, not individuals."

The soldiers commented on a variety of things that they needed during the deployment. What they referred to most frequently was a need for "level 3 ranger vests." A substantial number also called for armoring HUMVEEs. "HUMVEEs need quieter engines, bulletproof windows and gunner's hatch, detachable shield for the gunner, more space for ammunition, and more armor." One soldier said that "HUMVEEs can't be used as APCs," and another said that the Army should "reinforce the floors against mines." Another called for armoring combat vehicles and equipping trucks with bulletproof doors and glass.

The soldiers said that they needed close combat weapons such as shotguns, sniper weapons, better radios, and they said that passive vision sights should not just be supplied to leaders. They said that "we should have had the same equipment as the

rangers," and that "only the elite forces that we rescued had high tech equipment." They also said that they needed armor, artillery and air support, and that the Army should have used mortars more.

A substantial number of soldiers commented on training, or additional training, that they believed they needed. They referred to survival, stress management, negotiations, preparation for weather, for the threat, cross training on weapons, urban warfare, live fire training, and pre-mission training with other U.S. and U.N. forces. One soldier suggested that the Army use the video footage of Somalia for training.

Soldiers said that they had problems with the multi-language coalition, that the U.S. military should be separate and should not get involved with the U.N. They claimed that U.S. troops need U.S. commanders for cohesion and confidence in their leaders. A few soldiers expressed hostility toward the Somalis such as "the Somalis were ungrateful," and that they "didn't want to improve their standard of living."

Some soldiers suggested that the Army needs to control the media and not allow it to dictate policy. They urged restraint on films such as those of bodies being dragged through the streets. They also said that it is important for the Army not to mislead the media because soldiers will be exposed to those reports.

A few soldiers complained that they would be liable for more income tax because hazardous duty pay is taxable but separate rations payments, which had been withdrawn, are not. They also said that they were denied the \$75.00 a day U.N. payments that other countries' military accepted.

One soldier said that the U.S. should not interfere in civil wars. Another said that the "U.S. should solve its problems at home and keep out of other countries' problems."

A substantial number of comments concerned the need to provide a firm redeployment date to the troops. Others commented on the need for better communications to the troops in Somalia and one soldier said that "intelligence was terrible."

Scattered comments included "make sure everybody knows that no one is scared of the U.S.," "don't listen to rumors," "don't underestimate the enemy," "try for volunteers for the next deployment," "always prepare for the worst in terms of weapons and ammunition," and that some of the noncombat branches of the U.S. Army were incompetent. They also said "it would be nice to have a beer once in a while."

There were some positive comments. Some soldiers said that "our battalion was well trained," that "training to ranger standards reduced casualties and made the difference between success and failure." Other comments included the observations that "U.S. soldiers did well over there," that "cohort units work," that the experience helped soldiers to mature, to appreciate what they have, and never again to take things for granted.

Discussion

Background and Preparation for Deployment Most soldiers were not eager to go to Somalia and some expressed strong reluctance. However, they said that they were well prepared to go and perform both humanitarian and combat duties. They also said that their units were "ready to go." When asked about their readiness at the time they were responding to our inquiries, they claimed to be still well prepared.

Observations and Experiences during Deployment The majority of soldiers expressed the opinion that the U.S. Army performed well in Somalia, that soldiers performed the duties for which they were trained, and that they found it very useful to experience realistic situations in which they could use their training. They reported favorably about their leaders' performance during the deployment. They said that leaders took care of the troops, led from the front, planned well, kept soldiers informed, got needed resources, were cool under pressure, kept morale high, and saved lives. Just about universally, soldiers agreed that the Somalia experience improved their leaders as trainers and leaders. Lest this glowing endorsement appear to contradict the data displayed in Table 13, it should be noted that it represents observations gathered from soldiers who were interviewed and who were all assigned to the same battalion. Table 13 reflects opinions of soldiers from a broad range of units and may refer to leaders in garrison, not combat.

Most soldiers reported difficulties with joint U.S.-U.N. participation. They referred to language problems, claimed that U.N. troops were paid better but did less than U.S. troops, that the U.N. rules of engagement were too restrictive, and said that U.S. troops should be independent of U.N. control. They also had problems because of the constantly changing mission, and with identifying friends and foes. They reported that their and their units' morale levels during both the humanitarian and combat parts of the mission were only moderate.

The duties that the soldiers performed included relocating and providing medical support to civilians, constructing transportation systems, water treatment and sanitation facilities, moving supplies, distributing food, and protecting relief workers. They also reported encountering ambushes, mines,

sniper, artillery, rocket, and mortar fire. They went on combat patrols, were surrounded by hostile Somalis, and witnessed military and civilian casualties. The conditions that bothered them most were heat and boredom.

Perspectives on the Changing Army Most of the responses to our inquiry about the appropriateness of the Army's participating in alternative missions were positive with the single exception of peacekeeping missions. When we asked whether the soldiers would volunteer for alternative missions, once again most answered positively with the exception of another Somalia type of mission, for which most soldiers said they would not volunteer. They offered reasons for their unwillingness to volunteer such as the undesirability of getting involved in another country's civil war, family separation, and that serving in Somalia didn't do any good.

We asked if special training would be needed to participate in alternative missions. The most frequent suggestions for additional training involved skills needed for peacekeeping. They referred to training about other cultures, in public relations, negotiating skills, and languages. We also asked if the soldiers believed they could succeed in alternative missions given the training, equipment, weapons, leaders and unit members they worked with. Most soldiers said yes.

We asked for the soldiers' opinions concerning whether the best commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted soldiers would be likely to stay in the downsizing Army. The most frequent responses expressed doubt that these service members would stay.

Personal Effects of the Deployment The soldiers were asked to tell us about especially stressful situations that they experienced during the deployment. The majority described combat situations with particular emphasis on the battle that took place on October 3rd-4th, 1993. Then we asked if their experiences improved their performances as soldiers. Overwhelmingly they said yes and referred to greater maturity, endurance, and adaptability, as well as to the value of training.

We inquired into the level of satisfaction that the soldiers felt about a variety of situations. They were satisfied with the support that they received from the American people and the performance of U.S. soldiers in Somalia. However, they were dissatisfied with decisions that had been made by top U.S. and U.N. military and with the amount of recognition they received for their performance.

We asked the soldiers about their attitudes toward their jobs. Most said that they were willing to take on extra duties, worked hard and tried to do a good job, and were personally

involved in their work. However, they also said that they did not look forward to coming to work every day.

About the members of their work groups, the soldiers agreed that they worked well together, pulled together to get the job done, and really cared about and trusted each other. When they were asked the same questions about their work unit leaders, they agreed that the leaders worked well together and pulled together to get the job done. They showed a much lower level of agreement for the statements about leaders really caring and trusting each other.

We inquired about whether the soldiers would advise another person to join the Army, join another military service, or not join the military at all. Slightly more than half of the soldiers said they would advise the person to join the Army.

Career Intentions Of the soldiers who filled out the questionnaire, a little more than half claimed that they would definitely or probably stay in the Army at least beyond their present obligations. In the case of the soldiers interviewed, those who intended to stay in the Army and those who intended to leave the Army after fulfilling their immediate obligation did not change their intentions from pre to post deployment. However, those who were undecided before the deployment tended to say that they planned to leave the Army.

Personal and Family Issues We asked about soldiers' communications with their families during the deployment. They reported that it was sometimes difficult and usually slow but that they were able to communicate. They said that their families fared well during the deployment although they were upset by rumors and by news of combat in Somalia. They also said that their families were reassured by unit officers who wrote to them.

Spouses tended to support their husbands during the mission but wouldn't want them to have to repeat it. They also tended to support their husbands' making the Army a career.

When we asked where soldiers would look for help with a personal or family problem, the choice selected most frequently was parents or close relatives, followed by a coworker, a noncommissioned officer at the place of duty, an Army neighbor or friend, and a neighbor or friend not in the Army.

We inquired into the status of soldiers' marriages before and after the deployment. A slightly lower percentage reported that their marriages were going extremely well after the deployment than reported the same thing before the deployment (65% vs. 71%). Correspondingly, a slightly lower percentage reported that they had discussed or filed for divorce before the deployment than afterward (18% vs. 26%).

Soldiers' Comments Many of the comments that soldiers made mimicked information gathered by interviews and the questionnaire. These included their feelings that the mission was not clearly defined and was politically directed, their antipathy for Somalis and isolationist attitudes toward intervening in other countries' conflicts, their reports of poor coordination with U.N. forces and their desire that U.S. troops be under U.S. command, their frustration with restrictive rules of engagement, and their appeal for exercising control over the media.

They also offered comments on issues that we did not cover in our research instruments. A substantial number of soldiers expressed strong feelings about being entitled to Combat Infantryman's Badges. In addition, they detailed training, weapons, equipment and support, such as armor and air support, that they lacked during the deployment. They pointed to a need for a firm, unchanging date for redeployment and they complained about the poor training shown by support troops. Perhaps the most interesting comments were made by mortar platoon members who said that they were underused juxtaposed with infantry soldiers' contentions that they needed more mortar support.

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APPENDIX A

PEACEKEEPING INTERVIEW GUIDE

PEACEKEEPING INTERVIEW GUIDE

DATE:

SOLDIER'S RANK:

BRANCH/MOS:

YEARS IN ARMY:

GENDER:

DOB:

EDUCATION LEVEL:

MARITAL STATUS:

DEPENDENTS:

DATE DEPLOYED TO SOMALIA:

DATE RETURNED:

JOB ASSIGNMENT(s) DURING MISSION(s):

WAS THE SOMALIA DEPLOYMENT THE ONLY "ALTERNATIVE MISSION" IN WHICH YOU PARTICIPATED?

WHEN YOU LEARNED YOU WERE GOING TO SOMALIA, HOW DID YOU FEEL ABOUT THE ASSIGNMENT? WHY DID YOU FEEL THAT WAY?

BEFORE YOU WERE DEPLOYED, WERE YOU GIVEN ADEQUATE AND ACCURATE INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT TO EXPECT IN SOMALIA? EXPLAIN

WERE THE DUTIES YOU PERFORMED IN SOMALIA THOSE YOU EXPECTED TO PERFORM?

HOW WERE THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN SOMALIA?

BEFORE DEPLOYING, WERE YOU WELL PREPARED IN TERMS OF: MOS TRAINING

TRAINING IN LOGISTICS

TRAINING IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

BRIEFINGS FOR SOLDIERS BEING DEPLOYED

BRIEFINGS FOR FAMILIES

INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE TO PREPARE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT

HOW WOULD YOU HAVE RATED YOUR COMBAT READINESS JUST PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYMENT?

HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR COMBAT READINESS NOW?

HOW WOULD YOU RATE YOUR UNIT'S READINESS NOW?

HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF ARMY MEMBERS DURING THE SOMALIA DEPLOYMENT?

WHAT DUTIES DID YOU ACTUALLY PERFORM DURING THE MISSION?

WHAT PARTS OF YOUR COMBAT-RELATED JOB (MOS) DID YOU PERFORM?

WAS IT USEFUL TO YOU TO PERFORM COMBAT-RELATED TASKS? IF SO, HOW? IF NOT, WHY NOT?

**DO YOU BELIEVE THAT SOLDIERS NEED SPECIAL TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING/PEACE ENFORCING SERVICE? EXPLAIN.

IF YOU COULD CHANGE THE WAY YOU CARRIED OUT ANY OF THE TASKS YOU PERFORMED DURING THE MISSION, WHAT WOULD YOU CHANGE?

HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR LEADERS IN SOMALIA? EXPLAIN.

WHAT DID THEY DO WELL?

WHAT DID THEY DO POORLY?

DO YOU THINK THE SOMALIA EXPERIENCE HAS IMPROVED OR HURT YOUR LEADERS' PERFORMANCE?

DID YOU, YOUR UNIT OR YOUR LEADERS ENCOUNTER ANY PROBLEMS BECAUSE THE U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATED AS PART OF A "JOINT FORCE?"

HOW WERE COMMUNICATIONS WITH YOUR FAMILY DURING THE DEPLOYMENT?

IN YOUR ABSENCE, DID YOUR (SPOUSE/FAMILY) FARE WELL?

DID YOUR SPOUSE SUPPORT YOUR DEPLOYMENT TO SOMALIA?

HOW DOES YOUR SPOUSE FEEL NOW ABOUT YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE SOMALIA MISSION?

HOW DO YOUR CHILDREN FEEL ABOUT IT?

**BEFORE YOU WERE ASSIGNED TO THE PEACEKEEPING/PEACE ENFORCING MISSION, DID YOU INTEND TO MAKE THE ARMY YOUR CAREER?

**NOW THAT YOU HAVE RETURNED, HAVE YOU CHANGED YOUR CAREER INTENTIONS? (IF SO, ASK WHY)

**WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE ARMY'S PARTICIPATING IN ALTERNATIVE MISSIONS:

PEACEKEEPING/PEACE ENFORCING

DRUG INTERDICTION

CIVILIAN DISORDER

DISASTER RELIEF

COUNTER TERRORISM

TRAINING FEDERAL, STATE, MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

WOULD SUCH PARTICIPATION REQUIRE SPECIAL TRAINING? IF SO, WHAT TRAINING?

WOULD SUCH PARTICIPATION AFFECT COMBAT READINESS? IF SO, HOW?
**WOULD YOU VOLUNTEER FOR ANOTHER DEPLOYMENT LIKE SOMALIA? WHY OR WHY NOT?
WOULD YOU VOLUNTEER FOR ANY OF THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE MISSIONS? WHY OR WHY NOT?
CAN YOU REMEMBER ANY PARTICULARLY STRESSFUL SITUATIONS YOU FOUND YOURSELF IN DURING THE SOMALIA DEPLOYMENT?
CONSIDERING YOURSELF AS A SOLDIER, DO YOU THINK THE SOMALIA EXPERIENCE IMPROVED OR HURT YOUR PERFORMANCE?

WHAT ARE THE "LESSONS LEARNED" THAT YOU BROUGHT BACK FROM YOUR SOMALIA EXPERIENCE?

APPENDIX B

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

FORT DRUM, NEW YORK

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 1994

Page 1 472 SI SURVEY NETWORK SI SURVEY S

Purpose: The purpose of this research is to gather information concerning significant experiences of Army personnel who participated in Operation Restore/Continue Hope and to assess their effects on soldiers' careers. Each episode of peacekeeping or peace enforcement is significantly different from every other. Each offers valuable opportunities to improve the effectiveness of future doctrine, force development, and training. Lessons learned from Operation Restore/Continue Hope need to be assessed to prepare soldiers better for future assignments and Army careers.

NOTICE

- 1. READ CAREFULLY EACH QUESTION AND ALL THE POSSIBLE ANSWERS before selecting your answer.
- 2. PLEA ECORD YOUR ANSWERS IN THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE.
- 3. THE SURVEY WILL BE USED BY RESEARCH STAFF ONLY.
 Only researchers involved in collecting or preparing the information for analysis will have access to these questionnaires. Only group statistics will ever be reported. Your social security number and other identifying information will be stored in a computer file separate from your answers to this survey.
- 4. YOUR PARTICIPATION IS NEEDED.
 The Army needs information from you in order to make good personnel policy decisions. Your participation in the survey is voluntary. Failure to take the survey or to respond to any question will not result in any penalty. However, your participation is encouraged so that your attitudes

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT

Authority: Title 5, Section 3012, Title 10, U.S.C. E.O. 9397

Principal Pupose: To obtain additional data from other information sources.

Routine Uses: To allow survey data to be compared with data from other information sources to identify trends.

Disclosure: Voluntary, Providing information requested is completely decretionary and will result in no adverse personnal actions if emitted.

Point of Contact:

Dr. Joan Harman

and opinions will be represented in our data analyses.

US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue Arlington, VA 22333-5600

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\circ		Page 2	4511		
Form Number 756 11 S SG		SURVEY NETWORK*			

OPERATION RESTORE/CONTINUE HOPE

In this survey, you are asked about events and experiences related Restore/Continue Hope. Throughout this section, the following terms.	——————————————————————————————————————
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE deployment to Somalia during to December, 1992 - May, 1993.	the time period
OPERATION CONTINUE HOPE deployment to Somalia during June, 1993 to present.	g the time period
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR includes noncombatant every support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance as security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show a insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, and attacks and raids.	nd disaster relief, operations, combating
How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with Neither satis	Very satisfied Satisfied
	Dissatisfied dissatisfied
1. the level of support you received/felt from the American people during Operation Restore/Continue Hope? 2. the performance of U.S. soldiers who served in Operation Restore/Continue Hope? 3. the quality of decisions made by top level U.S. military officials during Operation Restore/Continue Hope? 4. the quality of decisions made by top level U.N. military officials during Operation Restore/Continue Hope? 5. the recognition given for the performance of soldiers who served in Somalia?	00000
•	

Describe how well prepared you were/are to perform	0
your WARTIME duties/mission	
	Very well prepared
•	Well prepared
	Moderately prepared
	Not well prepared
	Not at all prepared
	1 1 1 1
halos the start of Oceantics Baston House	
. before the start of Operation Restore Hope? . during Operation Restore Hope?	NANAN N
. during Operation Restore Hope?	NAKKK
. today?	XXXXX
	99999
escribe how well prepared you were/are to perform your	
PERATION OTHER THAN WAR duties/mission	11111
	7 7 7 7
O. before the start of Operation Restore Hope?	00000
1. during Operation Restore Hope?	0000
2. during Operation Continue Hope?	QQQQQ
3. today?	00000
4. To what extent did your wartime mission prepare you	for your duties in Sometic?
Very great extent Moderate extent	Not at all
Great extent Slight extent	O Mickel and
am confident that I could succeed in Operations Other Than War with	
	Strongly Disagree
	Disagree
	Neither agree nor disagree Agree
	Strongly agree
	* * * *
5. the training the Army has provided me.	
6. the equipment the Army had provided me.	מממממ
7. the weapons systems the Army has provided me.	00000
8. the abilities and training of my leaders in my unit.	00000
9. the abilities and training of the other soldiers in my unit.	00000
Page 4	
	son <u> </u>
www.n.n 📕 📕 SURVEY NETWOR	K: = = = == ==

Overall, how would you describe your level of preparation to deploy/relocate	Very well prepared (
	derately prepared
Not at all pr	vell prepared appared
20. when you were notified of your INITIAL deployment/	++++
relocation to Somalia?	00000
21. now?	00000
	(
22. Other than Operation Restore/Continue Hope, have you served in addit	ional (
Operations Other Than War? Yes No	
23. Did you deploy to Southwest Asia during Operation Desert Shield/Desert I was not in the Army during that time. Yes	rt Storm?
I was not in the Army during that time.) NO
24. Which ONE of the following describes your current active Army career i	ntentions?
MARK ONE. PROBABLY stay in until retirement	
DEFINITELY stay in until retirement	
PROBABLY stay in beyond my present obligation, but not necessarily	
DEFINITELY stay in beyond my present obligation, but not necessarily	to retirement
PROBABLY leave upon completion of my present obligation DEFINITELY leave upon completion of my present obligation	
	,
25. If you met someone who asked your advice about joining the Army, wo	uld you
recommend he/she join the Army	
join another military service	
not join a military service	
	1
	(
	•
•	•
	•
	•
•	•
Page 5	6262
SURVEY NETWORK®	

VOL	AND	VAL	R UNIT
IUU	ANU	TUU	K UNII

How would you rate... Very high **Moderate** Very Low 26. YOUR morale during Operation Restore Hope? 27. morale in YOUR unit during Operation Restore Hope? 28. **YOUR morale during Operation Continue Hope?** 29. morale in YOUR unit during Operation Continue Hope? 30. YOUR current level of morale? morale in YOUR unit at the present time? 31. Use the following scale to tell us how much you **Strongly Disagree** agree or disagree with the following Disagree statements about your work group. Neither agree nor disagree Agree **Strongly Agree** 32. I don't mind taking on extra duties and responsibilities in my work group. 33. I work hard and try to do as good a job as possible. 34. I look forward to coming to work every day. I am personally involved in my work. 35. Members (not leaders) in my work group... 36. work well together as a team. 37. pull together to get the job done. 38. really care about each other. 39. trust each other. Leaders for my work group... 40. work well together as a team. 41. pull together to get the job done. 42. really care about each other. 43. trust each other.

Page 6 **SURVEY NETWORK**

44. In what month did you deploy/reloca December 1992 January 1993 February 1993 March 1993 April 1993 May 1993 June 1993	Ady 1993 August 1993 September 1993 October 1993 November 1993 December 1993		O	
45. How long did you serve in Somalie do Less than 1 month 1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months	sring Operation Restore/Continue F S months 6 months 7 months 8 months or mon			
46. How many days prior notice did you support of Operation Restore/Contin Does not apply; I did not deplo 1 day or less 2-3 days 4-7 days 8-11 days 12-15 days 16 or more days	ue Hope?	sted in		
Before you deployed to Somalia, did you r	eceive a briefing on			-
 47. politics and culture of Somalia? 48. health risks for soldiers serving in So 49. your mission in Somalia? 50. rules of engagement? 	omalia?	VES COO		
	Page 7 SURVEY NET WORK			

Pi	ease indicate which of these events you experienced during you	r deployment to Somelia.	0 -
		YES I	WO =
51	I served in a unit that relocated threatened civilian		_
	noncombatants.	\mathcal{L}	⊋ •
-	 I served in a unit that provided medical support to civilians. I served in a unit that constructed surface transportation system 	_	3 :
	 I served in a unit that constructed surface transportation system I served in a unit that provided water treatment and/or basic 		٠ :
•	senitation facilities.	0 (\circ
	P. Marine Marine and area of a second and a second assessment		
-	5. My unit helped move supplies to remote areas.	\mathbf{Q}	Q •
	5. My unit helped distribute food/supplies to needy civilians.	\sim \sim \sim	२ •
34	7. My unit protected relief workers/work sites.	0 (
58	3. I was stationed at a forward observation post.	\circ	$\overline{}$
59). I received incoming ARTY, rocket, or mortar fire.	8 8	> .
60). I encountered mines or booby traps.	8 8	> .
61	l. I received sniper or sapper fire.	8	5.
57	2. I went on combat patrols.		\neg
_	3. I went on peacekeeping patrols.	\succ	≺ :
	I. I was in a patrol that was ambushed.	\bowtie	≺ :
	5. I fired rounds at hostile Somalii.	\boldsymbol{H}	3
	5. I was surrounded by hostile Somalii.	\mathbf{a}	3
	•		<u> </u>
-	7. I witnessed civilian casualties.	0 (\supset \cdot
-	3. I witnessed hostile Somalii casualties.	Q	5 •
). I witnessed casualties in my unit.	Q	\supset .
70). I witnessed casualties involving other allied troops.	0 (
•.	and the second was the fellowing a graphic feet and in Compiler.		•
16	what extent were the following a problem for you in Somalia:	Not at	
		Slight extent	
		Moderate extent	•
		Great extent	•
		Very great extent	
		* * * *	•
71	. insects, snakes, scorpions, etc.?	\hat{O}	\circ
72	. heat?	ממממ	\circ
	boredom?	7000	\circ
	. unfamiliar diseases?	0000	\circ
75	i. maintaining personal hygiene?	0000	\circ
76	i. having a clearly defined mission?		\circ
77	'. identifying friends and foes?	ろてて	50 ·
78	l. having to follow restrictive rules of engagement?	ろひひ) O
79	. having a constantly changing mission?	2000 2000	\circ
• ::	Page 8	THE	
,			
	SUP EY NETVICE.	,	

		- -	ONAL AND FAM	IILY ISSUES		0-
80.	Wha	t is your current marital st	atus?			_
	8	Married Legally separated or filing Divorced	for a divorce	8	Single, never married Widowed	
8 1.	8	you now engaged or signi rds, is there an important (Does not apply; I do not h Yes No	girffriend/boyfriend in ave a spouse/girffrien	n your life right d/boyfriend.	now?	
6 2.		w supportive is your spous ny? Does not apply; I do not h Very supportive Fairly supportive Mixed or neutral Fairly unsupportive Very unsupportive Don't know			g a carear or the	
Ť		extent can you count on ti lp with a personal or family	_	Verg	Slight Moderate extent Great extent y great extent	Not at all extent
83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.	An Son An An Sta Civi	officer at your place of duty NCO at your place of duty neone else you work with eighbor or friend who is in t eighbor or friend who is not if of an Army service agency lian minister or staff of a so civilian community ents or other close relatives	the Army in the Army y (for example, ACS or cial service agency in	• •	- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	888 888 888
91.	Did	you have to return early f Yes No	rom Somalia due to a) personnal or fa	nmily problem?	
₹.		And the State of t		pe 9		
					72	
			SURVEY NET	WORK		

How supportive of ARMY FAMILIES are the follow your current location? 92. Officers in high post/installation positions	Does not apply Do not know Very unsupportive Unsupportive Neutral Supportive Very supportive
93. Officers at my place of duty	- 888888
94 . NCOs at my place of duty	
95. My unit's Family Support Group/Spouses' Group 96. My unit's chaplain	
TO. MY WINCE CHEPONI	
97. Are the single soldiers in your unit members Does not apply; my unit does not have Yes No Do not know	
How supportive of SINGLE SOLDIERS are the foll you current location?	
98. Officers in high post/installation positions 99. Officers at my place of duty 100. NCOs at my place of duty 101. My unit's Family Support Group/Spouses' Group 102. My unit's chaplain	Does not apply Do not know Very unsupportive Unsupportive Neutral Supportive Very supportive

SURVEY NETWORK

120 ON P. GE 12).	MARRIED, GO TO QUESTION	
Before you deployed to Somalia, did you:	YES NO	
103. Think your marriage was going extremely well? 104. Think your marriage was going fairly well? 105. Think your marriage might be in trouble? 106. Seriously think about getting a divorce? 107. Seriously discuss divorce or separation? 108. Actually file for divorce or separation?		
When you returned from the deployment to Somali following for you?	a, how difficult was each of the	
following for your	Does not Very Diffici Difficult	
Ne	either Easy Nor Difficult	
	Very Easy	
	j	
109. Adjusting to new daily household routines 110. Sharing household decisions	8888	88
111. Sharing family financial management 112. Marital intimacy	8888	88
113. Sharing discipline/handling you children	8888	8
Since you returned from Somalia, did (do) you	WEC NO	
114. Think your marriage is going extremely well?	YES NO	
115. Think your marriage is going fairly well? 116. Think your marriage might be in trouble?	88	
117. Seriously think about getting a divorce?	88	
118. Seriously فیسیدی divorce or separation? 119. Actually file for divorce or separation?	88	
	0 0	
		0180

CHANGING ARMY

Would you support using the U.S. Armed Forces to do the following Operations Other Than War?

Definitely would not Probably would not Probably would Definitely would

- 120. Combat the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S.
- 121. Provide humanitarian relief in the U.S. in areas hit by a major disaster
- 122. Provide humanitarian relief outside the U.S.
- 123. Be part of a U.N. peace-keeping force wherever needed
- 124. Combat terrorism which threatens U.S. citizens
- 125. Maintain a military presence in overseas areas of vital interest to the U.S. in order to prevent problems
- 126. Provide training to federal, state, and municipal employees

As the Army becomes smaller, how confident are you that . . .

Very unsure

Somewhat unsure

Moderately confident Very confident

Extremely confident

- 127. the best officers will stay?
- 128. the best NCOs will stay?
- 129. the best junior enlisted soldiers will stay?

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SURVEY NOTWORKS

*BACKGROUND INFORMATION	0:
130. Are you currently working In your primary or secondary branch/MOS7 Yes No	•
131. How satisfied are you with your current job? Very satisfied Satisfied Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied	
132. Are you male or female? Male Female	
133. Are you of Hispanic/Spanish origin or ancestry (of any race)? Yes No	
134. What is your racial background? American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut Asian or Pacific Islander Black White	
135. What is the highest level of education you have completed? Some high school or less, but no diploma, certificate, or GED High school diploma or GED From 1 to 2 years of college, but no degree From 3 to 4 years of college, but no degree A year or more of graduate credit, but no graduate degree Master's degree Doctorate degree Professional degree, such as MD, DDS	or JD (
Rank — Branch — Sranch	- (
Your assigned military occupational speciality (MOS): ag. 91-6 ag. 91-6 No. of dependents No. of dependents Dete of birth MM DD YY Years in Army No. of dependents No. of dependents No. of dependents	
Page 13	
SURVEY NETWORK:	

CO	M	M		M	re
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Use the space below if you would like to comment on any topics related to your recent experiences in Somalia or on any other aspect of Operations Other Than War.

Name —————	tob and amount during
Social Security Number:	Job assignment during deployment:
1,222 1,22 1,222	
SASSI SAI SASI	
:888 :88 :888 :888 :	

This is an ongoing research project. In a few years we may wish to contact you again to see how things are going. These last three questions are for our records only, so that we can get in touch with you if you move. Remember, everything you say is completely confidential and will be kept separate from your

SURVEY NETWORK

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other answers.

Yame: —	Relationship:								
	MBER)								
•		(STREET)			one:	(AREA CODE/NUMBER)			
(CITY)	(STATE)		(ZIP CODE)				ER)		
if this person is	a married woman, wh	at is her husb	and's full n	erne? -					
Name: ———			Relation	nship: —					
Address:									
•	MBER)	(STREET)			Phone:	:			
(CITY)	(STATE)		(ZIP CODE)		(AREA CODE/NUN	4BER)		
If this person is	a married woman, wh	at is her husb	and's full n	ame? -	,		-		
Name:			Relationsh	ip:					
Address: ———				-					
(NU	MBER)	(STREET)							
(CITY)	(STATE)	(ZIP CODE)		r rione.	(AR	EA CODE/NUMBER)			
f this person is a	a married, woman, wh	at is her hust	and's full n	iame? -					
f you are marrie	d or engaged, what is	you (husban	d's/wife's/	partner's)	full (n	naiden) name?			
						-			
(FIRST)		(MIDDLE) (L			r)				
f you are a marr	ied woman, what is y	our full maide	n name?						
(FIRST)		(MIDDLE) (L		(LAS					
THAN	K YOU FOR TAI	KING PAR	T IN TH	S SUR	/EY				